Browning points out, The Second Sex has exerted 'a prolonged impact in opening up the relevance of sexual identity to social and ethical questioning ' (p. 363) .
Historians of political thought will probably take issue with Browning's mapping of their own fields of scholarship -which he would anyway have expected. Sympathy is undoubtedly due for Browning's constraints (all of this is surveyed in just over two hundred pages, the second half of the book). But some major lines of interpretation are unfortunately passed over. For instance, although Browning notes that, 'On Hegel's death, opposing camps of Left and Right Hegelians … disputed the meaning of his system' (p. 265), the Right Hegelians are not discussed, and Oakeshott and Collingwood are drafted in to provide the alternative interpretation of Hegel to that of Marx. Other commentators are perhaps over-represented, especially Foucault, who speaks in the chapters on Hobbes, Kant, and Nietzsche, and is allowed to dominate the chapter on Bentham. The reader might feel that stricter limiting of introductory material and of Foucault's and Derrida's voices would have yielded room for some of the missing territory (such as Hegel scholarship) to be covered. Nevertheless, what is included will indeed be useful for students in need both of introductions to primary thinkers, and debates to engage with in their reading and written work. ' (pp. 138, 283, 313, 367) , it will not be entirely clear to students unversed in Gadamer how these 'horizons' themselves should be interpreted.
Browning's synopses of these theories of interpretation are not uncritical, but some specialists will be quick to identify inaccuracy in the criticisms that are given. He perpetuates, for instance, the widespread myth that 'contextualists' wish to 'rule out theoretical critique of past arguments' (p. 384), to proscribe the use of past authors in contemporary debate (p. 85), and that they 'presume that ideas and texts are susceptible of unambiguous intentional analysis' (p. 86). In fact, it is thought to be precisely such ambiguity that might prompt an historian to seek evidence other than the text, if what he wants to find out is what an author thought he was doing in saying, writing, publishing, etc.
Similarly, Collingwood is accused several times of assuming too much separation between past and present, and of being unaware that 'the interpretation of the past is inevitably to be conducted from a present ' (pp. 138, 383) . Collingwood actually argues the exact opposite of the first, and deals explicitly with the second -which elsewhere Browning seems partly to recognize in Collingwood's theory (pp. 48, 373), and in his practice (p. 186).
The question of interpretation is not settled at the close of the first part of the book because, as Browning points out, 'There is no better way of appreciating what is involved in these frames of interpretation than in reviewing how they make sense of actual past thinkers' (p. 3). He is undoubtedly right. But the interpretative narratives concerning the canonical authors are mostly allowed to speak for themselves. One also notices that the 'test cases' for interpretative approaches are also those with which they have already (famously) dealt. It also becomes clear that the interpretation theorists . It is not demonstrated that these different historians, philosophers, commentators, and so forth really do claim 'to provide exclusive and comprehensive forms for interpretation' (p. 389). It might be argued that this is a misunderstanding, generated perhaps by the insufficiently pluralistic presupposition that the question of interpretation is uniform. It might be argued further that questions of interpretation are better answered within the context of particular investigations; that the question, 'How should I interpret this?' should be specified with the counter-question, 'Well, what exactly are you trying to find out from it?'; and that any 'comprehensive interpretive framework' (p. 392) needlessly imposes an unprofitable restriction upon investigative autonomy. Browning himself is primarily interested in how old arguments might be used today, which is why, with that purpose in mind, he is anyway surely right to insist that 'Intentionality is not the sole guide to the reading of a text ' (p. 212 
